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FEARLESS COUNSEL: BEING AN ATTORNEY
FOR THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENT
MAURA C. DOHERTY*
The pro-life movement has rediscovered a key tactic of the
civil rights movement of the 1960s. Emotionally charged dem-
onstrations, sit-ins, and the participants - on either side of the
abortion battle - can present moral complications for an attor-
ney. Bewilderingly, an attorney counselling civil disobedients
is not free to exercise her professional skills and judgment as a
counselor, nor may she follow her moral convictions without
penalty from the legal profession. This article addresses the
sensitive ethical tension in which an attorney finds herself when
counselling clients who plan a civilly disobedient tactic;' specif-
ically, abortion clinic protests conducted by Operation Rescue
2groups.
Part I of the article will define civil disobedience, argue the
justification for its use, and respond to its classic criticisms.
Hypothetical trespass scenarios involving two clients in Part II
provide background mechanics of the pro-life protest and high-
light aspects of the Operation Rescue movement which an
attorney may face during her practice. An ensuing analysis and
weighing of merits in Part III attempts to provide the attorney
who wishes to counsel would-be civil disobedients with guide-
lines for active counsel. Part IV urges the modification of
MRPR 7-102(A)(7), which prohibits a lawyer from encouraging
or counselling such conduct. Since the ethical function of the
Model Rules are concerned with regulatory, technical sanc-
tions,3 retaining and enforcing attorney sanctions for such
advice chills the attorney-bar association relationship, under-
* A.B., History, College of the Holy Cross, 1986; J.D., University of
Notre Dame, 1991; Thomas J. White Scholar 1989-1991.
1. Compare this with the ethical latitude for an attorney advising
disobedience of a court ruling. An attorney in good faith and within the
framework of the law can challenge the correctness of a ruling of a tribunal.
See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-22. See also Note, Liability
of the Attorney who Advises Disobedience, 6 J. OF THE LEGAL PROF. 333 (1981).
2. This article neither condemns nor endorses the pro-life or abortion
rescue movements.
3. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REV. 963
(1987).
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mines the moral thrust of the Model Rules, and ultimately
thwarts reform of unjust legislation.
I. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN CONTEXT
A. Definition of Responsible Civil Disobedience
An attorney's decision to counsel two hypothetical clients
depends first upon what broad sentiments she harbors regard-
ing the issue of civil disobedience; how civil disobedience is
defined, justified, and distinguished from illegal conduct will
influence her performance as counsel.
Defining responsible civil disobedience is difficult; its mul-
tifaceted history, scope, and criticism lends it to many interpre-
tations, and thus, applications. A succinct definition of civil
disobedience, in the context of a hypothetical trespass action,
would be one where a given act is a deliberate, open violation
of the law or binding public norm, with the intent either 1) to
publicly protest a social, moral, or political wrong, or 2) to
improve the social order, while working within the framework
of the current political form of government, or both.4 For pur-
poses here, three more elements are necessary to complete a
working definition of civil disobedience. Responsible disobedi-
ent action must additionally include: first, a participant willing
to notify the proper authority of his violation of the law and to
accept legal sanctions (nonevasion); second, a nonviolent char-
acter, i.e., a refusal to respond with violence to provocations
(excluding a minimal amount of resistance to arrest); and lastly,
a primary commitment to educate or persuade the majority or
to improve society.5 While other scholars have posited similar
4. See Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEX. L. REV. 507, 508-
11 (1964).
5. E. ZASHIN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 110 (1972).
Keeton's definition of what constitutes a civil disobedient act segregates
principled or true or responsible acts of civil disobedience from unprincipled
conduct. For purposes of the article, this definition must not have inherent
prejudices against a particular cause, nor biases for another. This is tested by
situations such as the Ku Klux Klan membership who burn crosses in the
yards of those who disagree with their position. As under Keeton's
definition, the KKK's actions qualify as civil disobedience - assuming their
conduct is open and deliberate, and its members are willing to suffer the legal
penalties involved, and their motive is to "better society." That the KKK
complies with Keeton's definition does not render the definition incomplete
or faulty, but instead points to the great elasticity needed in the definition
and in the revision of MRPR 7-102(A)(7). See DiSalvo, The Fracture of Good
Order: An Argumentfor Allowing Lawyers to Counsel the Civilly Disobedient, 17 GA. L.
REV. 109, 139-40 (1982).
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definitions of civil disobedience,6 or have categorized the types
of disobedience,7 or simply criticized it as illegal,' this defini-
tion will serve as a foundation for this article.
B. Justification of Civil Disobedience
An attorney who contemplates counselling or representing
a civilly disobedient client should comprehend the justifications
of civil disobedience, as well as realize the impending discipli-
nary sanctions which could accompany her advice.9 Civil diso-
bedience is neither "right nor good in and of itself; it is both
beneficial and right under certain conditions."'" The debate
concerning the justification of civil disobedience ultimately
focuses upon the motivation of the individual who believes that
a law is morally unjust and thus morally unenforceable. After
weighing the political obligation to obey the law versus the
responsibility of conscience, the civil disobedient individual
makes the conscientious decision not to obey the unjust law.
That moral obligations outweigh an individual's legal obli-
gations is often justified by a natural rights understanding of
the law.l" Some natural law thinkers posit that "natural law"
follows divine or eternal law, as manifested through Biblical
scripture.m2 Others suggest that secular documents, such as the
6. Rawls defines civil disobedience as "[A] public, non-violent and
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of
bringing about a change in the law or policies of a government." J. Rawls,
The Justification of Civil Disobedience, in MORAL PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 132 (Rachels ed. 1970).
7. See R. Dworkin, Civil Disobedience and Nuclear Protest, in A MATrER OF
PRINCIPLE 109, 111 (1985).
8. See Schlesinger, Civil Disobedience: The Problem of Selective Obedience to
Law, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947 (1976).
9. Sanctions may range from disbarment, suspension, public censure
and probation by the state supreme court, to private reprimand by state
disciplinary boards. See, e.g., Pa. R.D.E. 204(a) PA. RULES OF COURT (1984).
10. Keeton, supra note 4, at 511.
11. The essence of a natural law understanding, according to Lord
Lloyd, "lie[s] in the constant assertion that there are objective moral
principles which depend upon the nature of the universe and which can be
discovered by reason. These principles constitute the natural law." L. LLOYD
& M. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 93 (5th ed. 1985)
(hereinafter LLOYD].
12. See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. 1-11, QQ 90-
97 (trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province) (1947-48). Aquinas
proposed that, in the case of Human Law which violated Divine Law or Holy
Scripture, "Laws of this kind must in no wise be observed." Id. at Q. 96, Art.
4.. Thus it appears that if a law directly violates "scripture" Aquinas would
agree that one has no duty or obligation to obey it. See Weber, Towards a
1991]
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Declaration of Independence in American law, also qualify as
reflecting this higher, natural law.'"
One aspect of this natural law view is secular; grounded in
a notion of fair play and mutual respect, it stresses the value of
participation and democratic equality. Another aspect of natu-
ral law is theological. It presumes a mystical, loving communi-
tarian union where eternal and natural law are "fulfilled by the
end of separation between human beings."' 4 The dual view of
natural rights, which includes a strict adherence to democratic
procedures as an approach for civil disobedient conduct,"5 is
best embodied by Martin Luther King.' 6 King explained why
he was willing to disobey a court order prohibiting a march
while continuing to urge white obedience to the Supreme
Court's desegregation orders: "[TIhere are two types of law:
just and unjust . . . . One has not only a legal but a moral
responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral
responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St.
Augustine that 'an unjust law is no law at all.' "7 Thus, one is
not obligated to comply when the law is unfair, and for King,
the law is unfair when it cannot be understood as generally
beneficial. 8
For some civil disobedients,' 9 who oppose a particular law
which protects morally offensive conduct, the solution is sim-
Theory of Civil Disobedience, 13 CATm. LAW. 198, 202-10 (1967); Lloyd, supra
note 11, at 152.
13. Natural law principles are reflected in the words, "We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness .... [t]hat whenever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or abolish it .... " The Declaration of Independence, para. 2
(U.S. 1776). See generally E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955).
14. Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2152, 2203 (1989).
15. This classic argument is embodied in two articles. See Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958);
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958).
16. Luban, supra note 14, at 2201-05.
17. M. L. King, Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 84
(1963).
18. For discussions of the fair play argument, see J. Rawls, Legal
Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 9-10 (S. Hook
ed. 1964), and Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185
(1955).
19. Particularly those in Operation Rescue or similar pro-life groups'.
See also infra, note 41.
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pie: obedience to God supersedes obedience to the civil law.
For others, it is not essential that the disobedience be religious,
as long as it is grounded in the moral framework of a civil sense
ofjustice. In this way, the community's subjective sense ofjus-
tice contributes to justifying civil disobedience. °
In contrast, utilitarian principles, another fundamental jus-
tification for civil disobedience, emphasize that moral duties
override the legal or political obligation to obey the law
because the government exists by the consent of the gov-
erned.2 ' Thus the "political" law is devoid of any divine
strength which would compel obedience; human-promulgated
law which governs the social life of citizens may contradict law
which does not contain a divine force of its own. Civil disobe-
dience is appropriate and justified, for example, in the context
of a Nazi authority, where no individual of conscience could
obey such law today.22
C. Responses to Criticism of Civil Disobedience
Whether the justification for civil disobedience is
grounded in a broad natural law or utilitarian view, the attor-
ney must distinguish the civil disobedient from the law evader,
the rebel, and the anarchist 23 in order to respond to the classic
criticisms of civil disobedient action. A common criticism of
civil disobedience is that the protester hides from his deserved
punishment; evasion of legal sanctions is frequently confused
with a pure civil disobedient act. Visibility of the violation
alone is insufficient to meet the requirement of non-evasion in
civil disobedience. Public demonstrators, who seek to overturn
what they regard as an unjust law or unjust application of the
law by their actions, yet who intend to avoid punishment, are
law evaders, not civil disobedients. On the other hand, a citi-
zen who readily accepts legal sanctions for participating in an
expression of his conscience responsibly underscores the
importance of legal order in society. Such protesters may be
motivated to take an opportunity to make a direct impact on
20. J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW" ESSAYS ON LAW AND MoRALMrv 262-
75 (1979).
21. See generally Greenblatt, Defense of the Civilly Disobedient, 13 N.C. CENT.
LJ. 158 (1982); Note, The Disciplinary Dilemma Confronting Attorneys Seeking to
Counsel Civil Disobedients, 23 DUQUESNE L. REV. 715, 718 (1985) [hereinafter
Note].
22. In a 1967 poll, a number of scholars agreed that civil disobedience
was justified in appropriate circumstances. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1967, § 6
(Magazine), at 27.
23. Keeton, supra note 4, at 508-11.
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law and upon policymakers, believing that their action is neces-
sary to maintain the "integrity" of the legal system.
24
Another criticism is that civil disobedience is so destructive
as to resemble civil rebellion.25 Civil disobedient conduct is
often misconstrued as an act done to undermine law and
order.26 This misdirected criticism fails to distinguish between
the intent of the civilly disobedient person and the results of
his or her conduct. The civilly disobedient person does not
intend to engender lawlessness even where that is in fact the
result. Although the device by which law and order is inter-
fered with, such as a sit-in, for example, is a temporary disrup-
tion used for a purpose other than interference itself, care to
avoid the encouragement of lawlessness is one of the obliga-
tions of responsible civil disobedience 7 and an important cri-
terion for the attorney counselling the disobedient client to
remember.
One spinoff criticism to the lawlessness argument is that a
civil disobedient individual acts to incite violence despite the
fact that other legal alternatives exist.28 Actually, civil disobe-
dience may prevent chaos by providing an outlet for rebellion,
but not encourage revolution. 9 As Cohen argues, a pro-
tester's behavior frequently signifies respect for the system of
law and a good faith effort to improve it, rather than contempt
for it.3 ° In response to those who contend that civil disobedi-
ence leads to an ultimate breakdown of respect for the law in
the community, Cohen replies that directing community atten-
tion to the subject of the protest, as well as to the content, and
24. Lippman, Civil Disobedience: The Dictates of Conscience Versus the Rule of
Law, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 233, 235 (1987).
25. Keeton, supra note 4, at 509.
26. See generally Schlesinger, supra note 8.
27. Keeton, supra note 4, at 510.
28. Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 955.
29. H. ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: NINE FALLACIES ON LAW
AND ORDER 18 (1968). See contra A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE (1968). In comparison, Rawls contends that the threat of
anarchy is non-existent as long as citizens generally agree on a concept of
justice and respect the fact that other citizens resort to civil disobedience. J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUsTICE 390 (1971). However, Rawls does not deny that
the possibility of chaos nevertheless exists. Id. When anarchy or chaos does
result from civil disobedience, Rawls places the onus of responsibility on
those whose abuse of power warranted the disobedience, and not on the
protesters. Id. at 390-91.
30. C. COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE
LAW 133 (1971).
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importance of law in general, is more likely to have a beneficial,
rather than an adverse, effect upon the community."'
Moreover, most protesters choose civil disobedience as a
last resort.3 2 Usually protesters do not randomly jump into an
illegal sit-in. Typically they take issue with a single, "immoral"
law instead of opposing all laws.33 Cohen claims that most civil
disobedients have a history of organized campaigning on
behalf of their cause. Only when the letters, marches, and
prayer vigils fail, do protesters seriously consider disobedience
to law as an alternative. 4
To conclude, civil disobedience
is not aimed toward overthrow of law and order. On the
contrary, it works within the framework of the legal sys-
tem to rectify specific wrongs. Where the wrongs pertain
to the processes of that system itself, the civil disobedient
intends not to render the over-all system inoperative with
respect to his own act. He may, in fact, want by his act to
render their absurdity and injustice more patent.3 5
Thus, there is a fundamental difference between the draft
dodger and the conscientious objector; the arsonist who bombs
an abortion clinic and then avoids due process, and the abor-
tion clinic protestor who willingly accepts legal punishment.
Neither the draft dodger nor arsonist seek to persuade or
instruct; their conduct is evasive, criminal and dangerous.
In the legal profession, however, there currently is no rec-
ognized difference between the attorney who colludes with a
client in a criminal objective and a lawyer who advises a civil
disobedient protester to participate in a civil disobedient
action. The difference, however, is a real one; it is the differ-
ence which distinguished such attorneys as John Adams,
Edward Bennett Williams, and Atticus Finch.3 6 The remainder
31. Id. at 153.
32. Id. at 167.
33. Freeman, Moral Preemption Part 1: The Case for the Disobedient, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 425, 433, 434 (1966).
34. Tierney, Civil Disobedience as the Lesser Evil, 59 U. CoLo. L. REV. 911,
971 (1988). In comparison, Rawls disagrees with the notion that legal
alternatives need be exhausted prior to engaging in civil disobedience.
Though he labelled civil disobedience as a "last resort" that should be used
only when necessary, he recognized that additional legal means could be
pursued contemporaneously. J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at 373.
35. Keeton, supra note 4, at 509.
36. Adams defended British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre;
Williams defended, among others, Jimmy Hoffa and Senator McCarthy, and
Finch, a fictitious attorney in H. LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960),
defended a black man wrongly accused of raping a white woman in Georgia.
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of this article addresses this difference in terms of a hypotheti-
cal trespass scenario. From this hypothetical, the article dis-
cusses guidelines for an attorney's ensuing counselling session
and historical examples of attorney disciplinary sanctions fol-
lowing similar encouragement and counselling. The article
then concludes with a suggestion for the revision of the disci-
plinary rule Which mandates such sanctions.
II. THE PRo-LIFE MOVEMENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
A HYPOTHETICAL
Consider Steven Wach and Linda Brace, two potential
abortion clinic protesters.37 Steven is a financial analyst in a
downtown firm; Linda is a graduate student at the local state
university. Both have become interested in participating in an
upcoming sit-in at a newly opened abortion clinic in the area.
The son of one of your respected clients, Steven has never par-
ticipated in such activity, but wants advice on whether or not he
should participate. Linda, however, has participated in many
demonstrations and is currently on probation for earlier diso-
bedient conduct in a neighboring town. She is concerned
about possible repercussions, should she participate, given her
probationary status. Although both state they are willing to
accept whatever sanction may arise as a result of their potential
actions, they have come to you, a practicing attorney in the
area, for advice concerning their potential conduct.
The strategy of the pro-life movement and its many
branches, which utilize massive demonstrations or sit-ins has
militantly succeeded in nationally dramatizing the abortion
issue as previous efforts have not. 8 Although there are a vari-
ety of actions indigenous to a particular organization, such as
the characteristic "rescue" conduct of Operation Rescue, the
mechanics and philosophy of the pro-life network are assumed,
for the sake of argument, to be similar.3 9
37. Hypothetical protesters and their responses are based upon
interviews with former student protesters involved in the pro-life and
Operation Rescue movements. Similarity in identity, names or decisions is
unintentional.
38. Operation Rescue alone has attracted several notable public figures
to its platform, including Rev. Jerry Falwell, Mark Bavaro of the New York
Giants, Anglican Bishop James Mote of Denver, Roman Catholic Bishop
Austin Vaughan of New York. Rice, Some Issues Raised by the Abortion
Movement, Donahue Lecture, presented at Suffolk University Law School,
Boston, Mass., Nov. 3, 1988, at 2 [hereinafter Donahue Lecture].
39. For a representative article, see Carlson, Please Don't Kill Your Baby,
Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1988 (Magazine), at 24-30.
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A. Pro-life Protest Mechanics
When abortion clinic protesters opt to trespass on land
belonging to another, they know they are in violation of the
law. They disregard the law, believing that their action
instructs others as to an alternative moral judgment,4 ° and
stimulates public debate regarding what they believe are'seri-
ous issues, in order to affect change in government policies.4
The mechanics of a particular protest vary in tactics, par-
ticipants, number and intensity. Some protesters gain entrance
to clinics illegally to attempt to dissuade patients from having
abortions.42 A more recent tactic is to hold sit-ins to block
entrances to the clinics.4" Some protesters have even gone to
the extent of chaining themselves to entrance doors and exami-
nation tables.44  Usually, the clinics contact the police, who
arrest the protesters for criminal trespass. Depending upon
the intensity of the protest, availability of finances, and the
number of participants, medical clinics targeted for persistent
protests seek permanent injunctions and/or damages.45
40. Protesters of abortion clinics typically attempt to avoid criminal
liability for trespass by convincing the court that abortion constitutes the
taking of human life. City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa. Super. 534, 539-42, 539,
A.2d 1325, 1327-29 (1988). Abortion clinic protesters trespass to encourage
others to avoid the "killing" of fetuses, which they believe is murder. Sigma
Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 467 A.2d 483 (1983).
41. J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at 364. Cohen, Law, Speech and Disobedience,
in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 176 (H. Bedau ed. 1969).
42. See, e.g., People v. Krizka, 92 111. App. 3d 288, 416 N.E.2d 36 (1981),
where demonstrators placed themselves between patients and clinic
employees about to operate, and Klocker, 637 S.W.2d at 174, where
defendants sat in a doorway after unsuccessful attempts to discourage
patients from entering.
43. See, e.g., Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 1979); City
of Dayton v. Drake, No. 11815, Ct. App. Ohio (1990); City of Akron v.
Detwiler, No. 14385, Ct. App. Ohio, (1990); Oregon v. Clowes, 100 Ore.
App. 266, 785 P.2d 1071 (1990) (sit-in at abortion clinics); People v. Stiso, 93
Ill.App.3d 101, 416 N.E.2d 1209 (1981) (protesters barred access to
operating rooms).
44. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073
(Alaska 1981) (two appellants chained themselves to door of operating
room); Gaetano, 406 A.2d at 1292 (organized defendants chained themselves
to tables).
45. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d) (1988). See Note, Necessity as a
Defense to a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L. REV.
501, 502 n.l 1 (1979), discussing Ohio v. Rinear, No. 78CRB-3706, Mun. Ct.
Hamilton County, Ohio (dismissed May 2, 1978); Northeast Women's Center
v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987). For recent cases at the
time of this note on permanent injunctions and civil damages, see New York
State NOW v. Terry, 732 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Roe v. Operation
19911
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Protesters have unsuccessfully attempted to utilize the neces-
sity defense 4 6 and the choice of evils defense as means ofjusti-
fying and defending their conduct in protesting abortion
clinics. At trial, defendants generally raise the necessity
defense, where they claim that the harm they caused by tres-
passing is outweighed by the harm they sought to avoid,
namely the killing of fetuses,47 or the choice of evils argument,
in which the evil of the illegal trespass was less than the evil
resulting from the killing of life.4" Clinic protesters' lack of
success in raising either defense can be attributed to two rea-
sons. First, the current legality of abortion negates an abortion
clinic protester's necessity argument that the killing of a fetus is
a harm greater than trespass.49 Following Roe v. Wade,5" abor-
Rescue, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); Town of West Hartford v. Operation
Rescue, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990). For additional reading on the
application of civil RICO in this context, see Note, The Use of Civil Rico Against
Antiabortion Protesters and the Economic Motive Requirement, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1341 (1990); Canan & Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAw & Soc. REV.
385 (1988).
46. By invoking the necessity defense, protesters hope to force a court
to carve out exceptions to the law, exceptions whose qualifying criteria
exempt a certain category of defendants from liability. In the case of
Operation Rescue, this exemption is grounded in moral duty. While some
courts have granted abortion protesters this exception (see Northern Va.
Women's Medical Center v. Horan, No. 78-94-A (E.D. Va. June 23, 1978),
(abortion protesters acquitted), cited in Note,Justified Nuclear and Abortion Clinic
Protest. A Kantian Theory ofJurisprudence, 21 N.E. L. REV.725, 727, n.l 1 (1986)),
more frequently, courts disallow the necessity defense fearing the
consequences of allowing too many exceptions, which would nullify the
applicable law. In abortion protest cases, courts generally deny the necessity
defense. See Gaetano, 406 A.2d at 1291; Northeast Women's Center, 665 F. Supp.
at 1147; Stiso, 416 N.E.2d at 1209; Sigma Reproductive Health Center, 467 A.2d at
483; Kocker, 637 S.W.2d at 174; Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1073; Bobo v. State,
757 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Smith, 161 Ill. App. 3d 213,
514 N.E.2d 211 (1987); Commonwealth v. Markum, 373 Pa. Super. 341, 541
A.2d 347 (1988); Wall, 539 A.2d 1325 (1988); Hoppart v. State, 686 S.W.2d
259 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). See also Griffin v. United States, 447 A.2d 776
(D.C. 1982) (necessity defense unavailable to protesters who entered and
opened churches to the homeless).
47. Gaetano, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 1979) (abortion clinic protesters
believed their conduct was necessary to save human life); Krizka, 416 N.E.2d
36 (1981) (defendants believed they would save fetuses by peaceably
interposing themselves between patients and clinic employees); Kocker, 637
S.W.2d 174 (protesters claimed harm avoided by trespass was the "killing of
human life" by aborting fetuses).
48. Protesters predicate their conduct on the definition that a fetus is a
"life" despite the Supreme Court's position that a fetus has no recognized
legal protection; see generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. "Under Roe, an abortion.., is not a legally recognizable injury, and
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tion is not illegal; such conduct is legally protected.5' Second,
the balance of evils test is similarly denied since the trespass
interfered with a fundamental and constitutional right. There-
fore the trespasser did not choose the lesser evil. In either
case, the trespass is legally unjustified.5"
B. Philosophy of Operation Rescue
Operation Rescue advocates sit-in "rescues" because they
manifest the philosophy underlying the Movement: "Legalized
abortion, a product of the secularized, contraceptive society
which makes man rather than God the arbiter of life, is
Satanic."5 " Randall E. Terry, founder of Operation Rescue,
describes the characteristics of the movement and its motiva-
tion for pursuing an avenue of civil disobedience, in terms
resembling Keeton's rationale for warranting civil
disobedience:
"To state our position concisely: Rescue missions are
saving babies and mothers today in such a way that stimu-
lates political change tomorrow .... It's a kind of passive
resistance. We go limp - there is no violence, no yell-
ing. The rescues are very peaceful, very prayerful ....
"Going to jail is probably the best statement we can
make at this time. We've had over 1,000 people go to jail
in the past three months. People see us and they say, my
goodness these people are willing to sacrifice their free-
dom as they stand up for these babies and mothers ....
people... make more sacrifices, and it makes the people
who are going to jail . .. courageous . . ." Our short-
term goal is to end the killings now; our long-term goal is
to end the child killing permanently by a constitutional
amendment." 54
therefore, defendant's trespass was not justified by reason of necessity."
Krizka, 416 N.E.2d at 37.
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage argued that the protesters could
not satisfy the illegal element of the defense because abortion was, in fact,
legal. 631 P.2d at 1078-79, n.10.
52. The current constitutional validity of abortion most effectively
short circuits clinic protesters' defense since it negates their justification for
their illegal conduct.
53. Rice, Webster: An Opportunity, Not a Victory, THE WANDERER, July 13,
1989, at 3, 12.
54. THE NEW AMERICAN, Nov. 7, 1988, at 19, quoted in Rice, Operation
Rescue; THE WANDERER, Jan. 19, 1989, at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
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C. Criticism of the Operation Rescue Movement
The Operation Rescue movement has come under intense
criticism from the pro-choice advocates as well as from some
pro-life supporters.55 Individual women and proprietors of
abortion facilities are pressing criminal prosecutions and indi-
vidual and class actions in tort and civil suits.5 6 Additionally,
the prospect of or enforcement of jail terms removes political
leadership from the movement,57 and lack of financial support
may shortchange the Movement's activity.58 Moreover, costs in
terms of time, inconvenience, and expense of a protester's
criminal and civil legal defense are formidable.
Pro-life protesters as well as their opponents argue that
the existence of alternatives other than civil disobedience "res-
cues" render the movement's conduct imprudent; the rescues
are not an efficient response compared to those which disrupt
55. For example, the Rev. Charles Stanley, pastor of First Baptist
Church in Atlanta, denounced abortion as "an abomination before God" but
opposed the disobedience tactics. Enemy of Abortions is Also Taking Issue with
Protest Tactics, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1988, at A14, col. 1. Of Operation
Rescue, Stanley said, "Where does it stop? If blocking an entrance is
permitted, then why not physical restraint .. .or even destruction of those
who are performing the procedure . . .? Anarchy and chaos will ultimately
result." Id.
56. See infra note 45. See, e.g., Maher, Abortion Protesters Barred from Clinic,
PA. L.J. REP. June 15, 1987, at 1, col. 1. (discussing Northeast Women's
Center Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (1989)) (federal court jury decided
protesters had violated civil anti-racketeering laws by creating a climate of
fear at the center); In Streets and Courts, Two Groups Struggle Over Abortion Issue,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 32, col. 2. See also Feminist Women's Health
Center v. Roberts, C86-1612 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (federal grand jury
convicted three people on RICO charges, and the judge awarded treble
damages amounting to over $900,000. One of the racketeers firebombed an
abortion clinic; the other two conspired to drive the clinic out of business by
repeatedly making false medical appointments and as many as 700 telephone
hang-up pranks daily).
57. At the time of writing this note, Terry, convicted on misdemeanor
charges of trespassing during a 1988 Atlanta clinic protest, was recently
released from jail, where he spent four months on a chain gang, rather than
pay a $1,000 fine in trespass and unlawful assembly. Bails, Abortion: Rescue
Bails Out, TIME, Feb. 12, 1990, at 29. Some 1,200 anti-abortion activists
demonstrated outside clinics throughout Atlanta during the 1988 Democratic
National Convention. Sherman, Courts Deal Blockaders Big Setbacks, NAT'L LJ.,
Nov. 13, 1989, at 30, col. 2.
58. Operation Rescue, headquartered in Binghamton, New York,
closed its doors due to a $50,000 lawsuit filed by the National Organization of
Women. Antiabortion activists privately concede that Terry's move is tactical
and say Operation Rescue activities will be supported by satellite and legally
autonomous chapters nationwide. Bails, supra note 57, at 29.
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the work performed at the abortion clinics in alternative
manners.
5 9
III. ADVISING THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENT-TRESPASSER
As of October, 1988 more than 7,000 persons have been
arrested for their participation in rescues throughout the coun-
try. 60 Protests and the cases arising from them have brought
the abortion battle and its legal fallout to at least 14 states. 6'
From 1977 to 1985, 231 clinics were invaded and 224 were
vandalized.62
Steven Wach and Linda Brace, now seated in your office,
present the extent of their commitment and participation.
Steven explains his motivations for participating in the demon-
stration; abortion, to him, "is the work of Satan. Rescue mis-
sions are saving babies in a way that prayer vigils can't."
Admittedly, the prospect of going to jail is frightening - which
is one of the reasons he has sought you out. In speaking with
you, he states that participating in the demonstration "is proba-
bly the best statement to make - it gives credibility to our
work."
Linda, chiming in, states that the abortion issue requires
publicity and the moral mobilization which a rescue effort
affords, because political institutions in need of change are too
slow. She expects this demonstration, like others she has par-
ticipated in, will be one in which she and her fellow students sit
59. Donahue Lecture, supra note 38, at 37-38. "Moreover, all the
arguments in favor of disruptive abortion rescues apply as well to outright
destruction of the abortuaries by bombing or arson. Indeed, bombing or
arson can put the place permanently out of business which the non-violent
rescuers cannot do." Id.
Some prolife advocates believe that Operation Rescue protesters are
willing to intervene up to the point that it does not involve violence,
following pacifist tactics of the 1960s. Some disagree. According to some
Operation Rescue extremists, since saving life is the objective of the rescue,
and abortion is murder, it would be morally justifiable to shoot the person
performing the abortion or to blow up the clinic. While the author of this
note advocates an attorney's right to counsel and even to encourage civil
disobedient action, she does not advocate this extreme position. Civil
disobedience does not encourage or condone violence; no attorney should
encourage such action, regardless of his or her personal feelings on the
subject.
60. Wash. Times, Oct. 31, 1988, at A3, col. 4.
61. Sherman, supra note 57, at 30.
62. Fauldi, The Antiabortion Crusade of Randall Tery, Wash. Post, Dec. 23,
1989, at C2, col. 1.
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passively, either in front of the clinic or inside the "abortuary"
itself. Linda explains she will not resist arrest, but will go
"limp" when carried off by police. With Steven, Linda declares
her plan is to sit passively, or chant, depending "on the mood"
of the situation.
A. What to Consider Regarding Hypothetical Clients
The initial reaction of the average attorney to two such
hypothetical clients, Steven and Linda, is most likely to be hesi-
tation. The attorney's decision to commit herself to her clients'
claims'and conduct is contingent upon a threshold judgment of
whether this conduct qualifies as civil disobedience or lawless-
ness; it must also include an assessment of the clients' conduct
in relation to the merits of the claims and -conduct of others. 63
Additionally, the attorney may have a variety of other consider-
ations, which may affect her willingness to become involved,
the quality of her advice, and depending upon whether or not
she fears disciplinary sanctions, her willingness to offer
encouragement.
In advising Steven and Linda, the attorney will consider
her financial interests, including impact upon current and
future clients. Additionally, the lawyer may and should worry
about the social consequences to herself, her spouse, and her
family.' Adverse reaction from the professional community as
well as from the community at large may accompany an attor-
ney who is counselling, although not defending, potentially
unpopular clients. 65 In order to effectively counsel Steven and
Linda, who are potential demonstrators contemplating tres-
pass, the attorney must fall on one side of the proverbial abor-
tion fence. A lawyer's attempt "to rationalize engaging upon a
distasteful course chosen by a client on the ground that what is
63. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1093
(1988).
64. Pollitt, Counsel for the Unpopular Cause: "The Hazard of Being Undone,"
43 N.C.L. REV. 9, 17 (1964).
65. Justice William 0. Douglas wrote of the 'black silence of fear'
hovering above the lawyer contemplating the defense of an individual
accused of Communist association and activity: "Lawyers have talked to me
about it. Many are worried. Some could not volunteer their services, for if
they did they would lose clients and their firms would suffer. Others could
not volunteer because if they did they would be dubbed 'subversive' by their
community and put in the same category as those they would defend. This is
a dark tragedy." Douglas, The Black Silence of Fear, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1952,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 37-38.
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to be done is the client's decision and [lawyers] are but tools" is
futile.6 6 In other words, if the attorney is professionally
involved with her clients, the public or professional community
may perceive she is emotionally or morally involved with their
cause - for better or worse.
Lastly, the attorney may try to insulate herself from
adverse reaction by refusing to take a fee for her services. Pol-
litt contends that such refusal typically backfires, because it is
perceived that the attorney who takes a case without demand-
ing a fee is sympathetic to the cause.6 7
B. Guidelines for Counselling
If the attorney decides to counsel clients like Steven and
Linda, she must identify any practical alternatives and discuss
legal and non-legal consequences in order to advise the two
would-be protesters whether to participate or not in the
upcoming demonstration.
Typically, the lawyer advising a client outlines the various
alternatives available to the client, including time, inconven-
ience, and expense of trial, settlement and possible withdrawal
from the controversy. Raising alternative strategies to a client
who has decided to pursue a course of particular action is a
delicate task; the attorney needs to respect, not ignore, the
beliefs of the clients with sensitivity.
In her counselling session, the attorney needs to address
the non-legal and legal repercussions of a civil disobedient act.
Such non-legal consequences could include the loss of employ-
ment, and social ostracism by friends and/or family. The attor-
ney should remind the protesters what are already "legal"
actions in which to participate;68 lawful alternatives available in
this situation include prayer vigil, peaceful march, and sidewalk
counselling. The attorney should also ask if either client, Ste-
phen or Linda, perceive additional alternatives available.
The lawyer also needs to completely analyze legal conse-
quences of the proposed action and each alternative involved
in this demonstration, in order to emphasize to her clients the
significance of the severity of the proposed disobedient action.
66. Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1080
(1979). See also Cihlar, Client Self-Determination: Intervention or Interference, 14
ST. Louis U.L.J. 604 (1970); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend The Moral Foundations
of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976).
67. Pollitt, supra note 64, at 20-21.
68. It is also "legal" for the attorney to advise these alternatives in the
sense that the attorney is not violating any Model Rule or Model Code
provisions.
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Penalties for protesters at abortion clinics include hefty fines,
permanent injunctions, and jail sentences, depending upon
whether the clinic chooses to apply certain prosecution strate-
gies." The attorney should also inform Linda, a client previ-
ously involved in civil disobedient conduct, that her
contemplated participation could jeopardize the probation sen-
tence she presently carries.7 °
The attorney cannot make the would-be disobedients
reach a conclusion, but she can facilitate the process and struc-
ture the argument, for or against such conduct, and highlight
social, political, psychological consequences. She should con-
sider how deeply conscience is involved in the protester's
potential actions, then weigh it against the importance of the
law to be broken, the disruption caused by the protest 7' and
the cost to the community as a result of the disobedience.72
Finally the attorney must allow Steven and Linda to decide
whether their actions are justified.
C. Weighing the Merits: Arriving at a Conclusion
If satisfied with her counselling session, the attorney must
weigh the merits of Steven and Linda's primary reasons which
morally warrant their proposed civil disobedience. 73 The attor-
ney's conclusion results from an analysis of six proposals which
test and evaluate the merits of her clients' strength of commit-
ment, legal understanding and involvement during the
discussion.
First, Steven and Linda both believe that the services of
the abortion medical facility present a serious injustice for the
fetus; they perceive their proposed trespass as a major oppor-
tunity for influencing, if not overturning the law(s) which is to
be reviewed by the state legislature in the next few months.
Second, both potential protesters lack a reasonable pros-
pect of obtaining a remedy through recourse of due process of
law; their petitions to state legislators have gone unanswered.
69. Preserving the Right to Choose: How to Cope with Violence and Disruption at
Abortion Clinics, Reproductive Freedom Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union 34 (1986). See also Sherman, supra note 57, at 30. For use of RICO in
abortion clinic settings, see supra note 45; see also Note, The Scope of NOERR
Immunity for Direct Action Protestors: Antitrust Meets the Anti-Abortionists, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 662 (1989).
70. See DiSalvo, supra note 5, at 145-46.
71. R. Dworkin, Civil Disobedience, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIousLy 220
(1978).
72. Cohen, supra note 30, at 298.
73. Keeton, supra note 4, at 509.
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Steven agreed with Linda that he believes "there is no other
alternative" but to demonstrate, and trespass, i.e., violate the
law.
Third, the would-be protesters perceive the unavailability
of effective, non-legal options that are less hazardous and less
costly than civil disobedience: the students conclude sidewalk
counselling is minimally successful; the medical clinic usually
counters such efforts by providing escorts for patients.
Fourth, the tactics and strategy of the proposed sit-in dem-
onstration would only minimally infringe upon other rights and
the social order. An experienced protester, Linda stressed the
importance of nonviolent, passive resistance for the sit-in for
the duration of the protest. However, neither Steven nor Linda
could promise the attorney not to make threatening phone
calls.74 Although they would not take responsibility for other
students, Steven and Linda assured the attorney that they
would employ sufficient caution not to incite violence on the
part of others. 75 Steven adamantly insisted he would do noth-
ing to harass, assault, or damage the property of those people
entering the clinic. Linda made similar promises, and said that
she understood that the women escorted to the "abortuary"
are under no obligation to engage in conversation with her, to
accept leaflets, or red rose corsages, a symbol of the anti-abor-
tion movement.
Fifth, the conviction that Steven and Linda feel with
respect to their moral compulsion to act must be strong. Here,
for example, when Steven and Linda were asked by their attor-
ney whether they were willing to universalize the moral princi-
ples on which they proposed to act, 76 they agreed that their
opponents would be morally entitled to employ similar tactics
in pursuit of their objectives. On the advise of their attorney,
Steven and Linda agreed to give advance notice of their
planned acts of civil disobedience to the authorities if in fact
they decided to participate in a sit-in. 7 Linda, furthermore,
74. See supra note 56.
75. The difficulty in assuring this in advance, Keeton correctly notes, is
that violence can be accomplished without a protester contacting or lifting a
finger - for example, by undermining someone's self-respect. Keeton, supra
note 4, at 516. If the typical abortion clinic demonstration - usually a
throng of people singing, chanting, waving signs and shouting abusive
epitaphs - materializes, Steven and Linda will tread a precarious line in
accomplishing what Keeton defines as "violence" or participate in what
Operation Rescue terms educational or converting conduct.
76. Keeton, supra note 4, at 514-19.
77. Notice of an intended sit-in has become critical in assessing
remedies in civil RICO suits; see, e.g., Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857,
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promised to contact the organizers of the sit-in to ask that the
student participants in the group take measures to clearly com-
municate the purpose of the protest to bystanders, as well as to
opponents. Finally, the stress that Steven and Linda place on
the moral basis for their conduct might make a positive impres-
sion on the thinking of neutral bystanders.
Sixth, the attorney must assess whether the contemplated
act of civil disobedience is an effective means of achieving the
ends sought by her clients.7" Stephen and Linda feel that the
fact they approached the attorney indicates that they respect
the system and look to it as a vehicle of change.
Thus satisfied with her clients' arguments, the attorney
concludes the counselling session. Although she does not con-
done violence, the attorney supports the students' planned dis-
ruption. In the end, she encourages Steven and Linda to
participate in the sit-in, and violate the law.
IV. DISCIPLINARY RULES & THE AT-rORNEY'S MORAL DILEMMA
A. The Code of Professional Responsibility
The Code of Professional Responsibility has been adopted
by the majority of states as the official standard of conduct for
lawyers. In 1977, the ABA decided to rework the Code, which
produced the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a
document designed to replace the Code and to become a new
model for individual states to follow. A growing minority of
states adopted the Rules, following the ABA's adoption of the
Rules in 1983. The remaining various states face a choice to
adopt the Rules or remain with the Code, or create a hybrid
disciplinary process.
The Code of Professional Responsibility was divided into
three levels, in descending order of significance and weight: as
Canons, Ethical Considerations (EC), and Disciplinary Rules
(DR). The Canons are the general overriding principles and
standards governing lawyer conduct. The Ethical Considera-
tions are "aspirational ' ' 79 objectives to which members of the
profession should strive; the Disciplinary Rules outline the
862-63 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing dismissal for lack of standing of those clinics
not blockaded by defendants "because Operation Rescue insists on keeping
secret which clinics it had targeted," which added to the threatened danger
that the clinics will suffer real and immediate injury).
78. Keeton, supra note 4, at 514.
79. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57
N.C.L. REV. 497 (1978).
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"minimum" level of conduct below which no attorney must fall
without being subject to disciplinary action.80
A lawyer may not aid her client in criminal behavior.
Under the ABA Model Code, this duty is expressed in Discipli-
nary Rule 7-102 which counters its call for the exercise of zeal
within the bounds of the law. The Model Code provides fur-
ther that it is a professional violation for a lawyer to assist a
client in conduct that is "illegal." DR 7-102(A)(7) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility states that an attorney "shall not
... counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows
to be illegal.... ",S The ABA Model Rules modify this obliga-
tion of the lawyer by prohibiting a lawyer from counseling or
assisting a client in conduct that is "criminal or fraudulent. '8 2
The pertinent Ethical Considerations explain the rationale of
this rule as "to prevent collusion between the attorney and the
client to perpetrate criminal or fraudulent acts." 3
While no cases exist in which an attorney has been sanc-
tioned for her involvement as counselor to civilly disobedient
behavior, it is clear from the rule and case law that a lawyer may
not assist in or render advice that would encourage a client to
engage in illegal or fraudulent behavior.84 Yet the language of
80. Id. See also Sutton, The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: An
Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970).
81. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7)
(1989). There is no substantial difference in adopting the ABA's rules; it has
a similar proscription against a lawyer counselling a civil disobedient prior to
the commitment of the act. Model Rule 1.2(d) provides, "a lawyer shall not
counsel or assist a client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
82. ABA Model Rule 1.2(d).
83. ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct EC 7-1, 7-10
(1989). It is improper for a lawyer to assist in a client's criminal objectives.
See, e.g., In re Siegel, 99 A.D.2d 87, 471 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1984) (corporate counsel suspended for engaging in fraudulent scheme
involving unrecorded cash sales of corporate merchandise with corporation
president and chairman of the board); Committee on Legal Ethics of the
West Virginia State Bar v. Harman, 367 S.E.2d 767 (W.Va 1988) (attorney
disciplined for receiving two five-dollar bills from inmate client to buy
marijuana). Nor may - an attorney agree to provide representation for
employees of an organization that is engaged primarily in criminal activity
without facing disciplinary sanction. See, e.g., People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510
(Colo. 1986) (lawyer violated DR 7-102(A)(7) when he counselled
undercover FBI agents to set up an illegal prostitution scheme).
84. See Davis v. Goodson, 276 Ark. 337. 635 S.W.2d 226, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1154 (1983) (lawyer advised client not to obey court order); In re
Masters, 91 Ill.2d 413, 48 N.E.2d 187 (1982) (lawyer advised client to comply
with extortion demand and aided client in doing so); Committee on Prof.
Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa
1991]
1062 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
rule DR 7-102(A)(7) provides sufficient latitude for disciplinary
action by state bar associations against attorneys who
encourage or advise a client to engage in responsible civil diso-
bedience,'5 making the actions of our hypothetical attorney a
violation.
Since the ethical function of the Model Rules are con-
cerned with regulatory, technical sanctions, and are uncon-
cerned with insight or conscience,86 an attorney can be subject
to disciplinary sanction for advising the client to pursue civilly
disobedient conduct. An act of civil disobedience, according to
our earlier definition, must include a public act and a knowing
violation of a technically valid law. Since the defiance of the
law is open and public, and frequently made known to authori-
ties in advance to avoid disorder, it is reasonable that an attor-
ney would possibly have contact with protesters prior to the
civil disobedient act. Although not a participant in the action,
the attorney may be subject to disciplinary and possibly crimi-
nal sanctions because she has encouraged or counselled those
involved in such conduct.87 Indeed, attorneys counselling cli-
ents whose sentiments do not follow contemporary points of
view often find their actions severely scrutinized by state bar
associations and disciplinary boards.88
An early study conducted by Jerome Carlin investigated
the correlation between the notoriety of an attorney's conduct
and the disciplinary sanctions which followed. Carlin con-
cluded that the
organized bar through the operation of its formal disci-
plinary measures seems to be less concerned with scruti-
nizing the moral integrity of the profession than with
forestalling public criticism and control .... Further evi-
dence that the organized bar is responding primarily to a
concern for preserving its public image is the considerable
importance of the visibility of the offense to the general
community in the handling of disciplinary cases.89
1976) (lawyer's license revoked for advising client to disobey judicial decree
and permitting client to make false statements during a deposition); Wright v.
Roberts, 573 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. 1978) (lawyer suspended for advising client
to violate restraining order). See also ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional
Conduct 31:702 (1990).
85. Note, supra note 21, at 730.
86. See Shaffer, supra note 3, at 963.
87. Note, supra note 21, at 730.
88. Lyman, State Bar Discipline and the Activist Lawyer, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 235 (1973).
89. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR
161-62 (1966) (emphasis added).
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Although there are no cases in which an attorney has been
sanctioned for her role as advisor to a civilly disobedient client,
there are several examples of activist lawyers subject to discipli-
nary sanction for their personal involvement in an unpopular
cause.90 One particularly dramatic example underscores the
conservatism of the state bar associations. James Gilliland, a
North Carolina attorney, decorated WWII veteran, and local
American Legion officer, advocated the policies underlying the
then recent Brown v. Board of Education9' decision which
required desegregation of public schools. Concomitantly, Gil-
liland represented eleven alleged communists before a regional
session of the House Committee on Un-American Activities,
and boldly suggested that the committee leave his clients alone
and instead pursue school officials who refused to acknowledge
the desegregation decision.9" After losing his social member-
ships and civic positions in the community, Gilliland was dis-
barred by the North Carolina State Bar Counsel for
"irregularities" in two later divorce suits.9" He was later
reinstated.94
The potential repercussions from enforcement of the cur-
rent Disciplinary Rule on attorneys and those attorneys
involved already with potential civil disobedients are enor-
mous.9 5 Regardless of whether disciplinary boards pursue the
90. See In re Arctander, 110 Wash. 296, 188 P. 380 (1920) (lawyer
disbarred for openly aiding clients to resist the draft); In re Smith, 133 Wash.
145, 233 P. 288 (1925) (attorney disbarred for publicly associating with
International Workers of the World (IWW) and encouraging strike and
sabotage); In re O'Connell, 184 Cal. 584, 194 P. 1010 (1920). See also In re
Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 A. 478 (1921) (attorney disbarred for his public
association with IWW people and admission that he was an anarchist). Id. at
210, 112 A. at 479. The trial court found Margolis advocated the use of force
if necessary to carry out his objectives." Id. at 210, 112 A. at 480. Thus, his
conduct does not fall within the parameters of civil disobedience as discussed
in this note. For further reference and criticism on the Margolis case, see
Note, supra note 21, at n.73.
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. Pollitt, supra note 64, at 9-10. The author provides many examples
of lawyers who received harsh sanctions from their respective state bar
disciplinary boards after either counseling unpopular clients or clients with
unpopular causes. See id. at 22-23.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Following an appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court [In re
Gilliland, 248 N.C. 517, 103 S.E.2d 807 (1958)], he was reinstated. See
generally Pollitt, supra note 64, for less dramatic examples of attorney
discipline and state bar myopia.
95. Compare MODEL CODE, EC 2-27, which states that the "lawyer
should not decline representation because a client or a cause is unpopular or
community reaction is adverse."
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active prosecution of these or related pro-life protest claims,
the chilling effect on attorneys sought by clientele predisposed
to civil disobedience is inescapable. While the chance of dis-
covery of prohibited conduct on the part of the attorney is
small, the penalty is great - ranging from formal reprimand to
disbarment - and the proscription alone is sufficient to pre-
vent the counselling behavior from occurring at all.96
Moreover, there is a related fear that since state bar
associations are not entirely unbiased, their political affiliations
would permit the selective enforcement of the rule as against
more outspoken or unpopular attorneys involved in unpopular
causes. The Model Code, according to DiSalvo, treats the law-
yer's power of moral judgment as nonexistent or, at best, irrel-
evant.97 When a lawyer represents those who approach her
concerning a specific matter or complainant, she is assumed to
set aside any personal belief or bias she may harbor about the
morality of the actions of which she is advising. There is no
requirement in the Model Code that the attorney identify with
her client's moral position," nor could it hold the lawyer mor-
ally accountable for decisions to represent or not to represent
clients and their causes.99 The Disciplinary Rules do not
authorize an attorney to dispense advice grounded in her per-
sonal morality to a client. Justice Black stressed the signifi-
cance of attorney discretion:
A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy
objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms
in order to obtain that goal. It is also important both to soci-
ety and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated - free to
think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar. 1o
Respective state bar associations and the legal profession
should allow the attorney greater freedom to assess the legal
96. DiSalvo, supra note 5, at 135. See generally first amendment "chill"
cases, including Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10-11, & n.9
(1979). But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (proponent of first
amendment chill effect unsuccessful). For "chill" arguments involving
attorneys, see Keller v. State Bar of California, 47 Cal.3d 1152, 767 P.2d
1020 (1989); Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201
(1981).
97. DiSalvo, supra note 5, at 136.
98. A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 817-21
(2d ed. 1984).
99. See Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms, 17 VAL. U.L. REv 3
(1983).
100. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957)
(emphasis added).
BEING AN ATTORNEY FOR THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENT
and moral ramifications of the client's proposed, albeit illegal,
behavior.
B. The Need for Revision
The Disciplinary Rule(s) require revision to support moral
conduct of attorneys who counsel clients to pursue true acts of
civil disobedience.
1. Construction of New Rule
DR 7-102(A)(7) should be amended to specifically exclude
from its scope those attorneys who encourage or counsel a cli-
ent to engage in civil disobedience actions. It is not necessary
to eliminate the entire Disciplinary Rule from the Code; its
present form provides a powerful and important deterrent for
those attorneys engaging in collusion with clients.
One suggestion proposed that DR 7-102(A)(7) be read as
"In ... [the] representation of a client, a lawyer shall not ...
counsel or assist ... [a] client in conduct that the lawyer knows
to be illegal or fraudulent except that a lawyer may counsel...
[the] client prior to acts of conscientious civil disobedience."
(The proposed revision would be supplemented with relevant
Ethical Considerations to avoid confusion as to what acts con-
stitute "conscientious civil disobedience.") 10 '
Another commentator calls for a similar amendment.
DiSalvo's proposed amendment states, "A lawyer shall not...
counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyers knows to
be illegal, except that a lawyer may counsel his client in acts of
civil disobedience. An act of civil disobedience, for the pur-
pose of this rule, is an act of deliberate and open violation of
the law with the intent, within the framework of the prevailing
form of government, to protest a wrong or to accomplish some
betterment in society."' 0 2 Again, supplementary Ethical Con-
siderations would have to be devised in order to make it clear
that the civil disobedients are ready to accept willingly the
appropriate legal penalty.
The DiSalvo proposal is a better construction for the pro-
posed amendment because it defines what constitutes civil dis-
obedience for purposes of the amendment. Although, at the
very least, Ethical Considerations are required to amplify the
definition of civil disobedience, there must be no singular ideo-
logical understanding of what constitutes a civilly disobedient
101. Note, supra note 21, at 731.
102. DiSalvo, supra note 5, at 141-42.
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act. To do so might accidentally eliminate other equally viable
applications of the revision by simply not including them. Nor
do we need to expand the definition of civil disobedience any
further than DiSalvo's proposed wording; we run the risk of
diluting the potency of the Rules and the law upon which civil
d'sobedience is measured.
However, bar associations need to realize that undesirable
causes need to be included under this disciplinary umbrella,
since counselling such would-be disobedients provides at least
an opportunity for people advocating particular views to
examine the moral basis of their intended actions.103 In addi-
tion, the status of the complainant (a private citizen, another
attorney, judge, or law firm) who brings the charge to the disci-
plinary board should not be heavily considered in this process.
2. Benefits of Revision
This proposal will have its critics; not everyone will agree
that an attorney should escape disciplinary action for encourag-
ing or advising civil disobedient conduct, most likely due to the
legal, political and financial disruption which accompanies it.
However, the benefits from revising this particular Rule clearly
outweigh the costs.
Acceptance of the amended version of the Disciplinary
Rules would produce several benefits. A revision would elimi-
nate the chilling effect implicit in the present Rules and would
mitigate the corollary fear of selective enforcement of the rule
by biased disciplinary bar agencies against activist attorneys.l°4
Secondly, the revision would similarly eliminate the moral
dilemma for a lawyer when the Rules require that she sever
personal sympathies from professional rules of conduct which
govern the profession.
Several policy recommendations accompany the adoption
of one of the proposed revisions. First, revising the old Disci-
plinary Rules and incorporating the application into the
increasingly popular Model Code would eliminate the detri-
mental effect of the lawyer's use of moral judgment. When an
attorney does exercise her discretion on controversial, national
issues which she considers personally or morally important, she
should not fear being sanctioned for encouraging or advising a
103. Keeton's definition is also sufficiently broad to encompass
challenges to both policy and the law. Thus it would cover Operation Rescue
"missions" as well as rescuers' forcible and often aggressive tactics in
blockading abortion clinics.
104. Note, supra note 21, at 731; DiSalvo, supra note 5, at 137.
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client in a similar vein. Additionally, as with the growing use of
alternative dispute resolutions, a type of counseling workshop
or instruction for such activist attorneys could be established
for the profession and by respective state bar associations.
Third, the revision would pre-empt or at least lessen political
controversies involving the state bar associations and activist
members of the bar. Bar associations need to recognize the
benefits of flexibility, particularly in light of the increasing pop-
ularity of the abortion issue - regardless of position - and of
other issues which involve civil disobedience in the public
eye.' 0 5 Lastly, the revision serves to ground the Moral Code in
a moral foundation, as its founders intended.
V. CONCLUSION
Responsible civil disobedience can exist in the current
social order today; it provides an effective and constructive
moral power on national issues. Whether it is right, beneficial,
or morally warranted to engage in civil disobedience in a par-
ticular situation is a complex decision. A solitary sit-in at an
abortion clinic alone may not effect the desired change which
an Operation Rescue Movement seeks; however, as a micro-
cosm of civil disobedience today, it exposes the need for
change, promotes public debate on a national issue and
encourages citizen involvement in the law and policy making
process.
As attorneys, we should not discourage this conduct, nor
penalize fellow professionals who can prudently advise or exer-
cise some control over a civil disobedient situation. The deci-
sion to participate in civil disobedient action can and should
involve an attorney; her involvement with potential protesters
in making the decision to participate demands freedom from
disciplinary sanction and compels acceptance from fellow pro-
fessionals. An attorney must be able to render compassionate,
morally justified, and sanction-free advice. Currently, the
adoption of civil disobedient tactics by Operation Rescue and
the intensity of the abortion debate underscores the need for
105. Recent examples of civil disobedience not involving abortion
clinics include: Andrews v. People of Colorado, 800 P.2d 607 (Sup. Ct. Colo.
1990) (nuclear weapons protest); Federov v. United States, 580 A.2d 600
(D.C. 1990) (homeless persons); Hemmati v. United States, 564 A.2d 739
(D.C. 1989) (unlawful entry to Sen. Robert Byrd's chambers); New York v.
Levi, No. 90N059390 N.Y. Misc. (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1990) (Aids Coalition to
Unleash Power "ACT-UP" protest); In re T.K., 462 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1990)
(juvenile trespass in cemetery); Wisconsin v. Ostensen, 150 Wis.2d 656, 442
N.W.2d 501 (1989) (sabotage to a U.S. Navy submarine base).
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defining the attorney's possible role in it as counsellor. Law-
yers who advise such potential civil disobedient clients to pur-
sue illegal conduct need protection from disciplinary sanction
meted out by state bar associations at the risk of stagnating
future legislative and professional growth.
